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ABSTRACT

Perspectives on leadership, the workplace, and changing values are presented in three papers. In "Changing the Shape of Work: Reform in Academe," Rosabeth Moss Kanter discusses the structure of academic career paths and ways to improve the quality of worklife for individuals employed in academe, applying theories she developed in her study on work in the corporate world. In "Changing Values: Implications for Major Social Institutions," Morton Darrow describes the challenges that changing values pose to all major institutions and would-be leaders. It is suggested that new leaders must be negotiators and integrators of diverse phenomena, understanding patterns of events and able to take charge in situations where their control may be limited. In "Leadership Needs of the 1980s," Michael Maccoby suggests that economic and social transformations demand a new leadership style. Personality and styles of leaders during different historic periods are sketched, covering the craftsman, the empire builder, the gamesman, and others. According to Maccoby, leaders should be able to analyze and reconstruct their organizations on the basis of social and economic realities, and with a real understanding of changing "national character." (SW)

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HE 013 209

(1) PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP

Rosabeth Moss Kanter
Morton Darrow
Michael Maccoby

American Association for Higher Education

The American Association for Higher Education

The American Association for Higher Education is a national association open to all individuals concerned about the value and effectiveness of higher education. Each year AAHE's National Conference on Higher Education brings together approximately 2,500 educational administrators, faculty, students, government and foundation officials, representatives from accrediting and testing agencies, and others, to clarify issues, disseminate effective educational practices, and discuss the future of higher education.

The theme of the 1979 National Conference was "The Academic Workforce: Opportunities for Renewal." Some of the papers prepared for presentation at the conference were selected by a review committee for publication in the annual conference series, *Current Issues in Higher Education*. Many of the papers in this series focus on the quality of worklife in academe and ways to improve it. In some cases, the papers have been revised by their authors and therefore differ somewhat from the actual conference presentation. They have not, however, been extensively edited or revised, since the purpose of the series is to disseminate the conference presentations as rapidly as possible. Points of view and opinions reflected in this series are those of the authors, not the Association.

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Introduction

The three papers in this monograph were developed for separate presentation at the 1979 National Conference, yet when looked at together they all identify good leadership as critical for the 1980s.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter discusses the structure of academic career paths and ways to improve the quality of worklife for individuals employed in academe, applying theories she developed in her study of work in the corporate world. She asks questions like: What do we know about the career tracks of administrators? Who are the "stuck" and the "moving?" How might jobs be redesigned to create roles for more "movers?" How can institutions that are unlikely to grow during the next decade create ways to enhance job opportunities and to empower more people?

Morton Darrow steps outside academe and describes the challenges that changing values pose to all major institutions and would-be leaders. Why is the authoritarian leader out of date? Why is the search for the "real me" futile? Why do pragmatic solutions and limited rationality rule so often, while optimal concepts are dismissed? According to Darrow, the new leaders must be negotiators and integrators of diverse phenomena, understanding patterns of events and able to take charge in situations where their control may be limited.

Michael Maccoby's belief that economic and social transformations demand a new leadership style assumes a historical perspective. He sketches the personality and styles of leaders during different historic periods—the craftsman, the empire builder, the gamesman—and asks, How will future leaders operate? Like Kanter, Maccoby feels that the new leaders will be those who are able to bring out the best in those who work in organizations. They will have to be able to analyze and reconstruct their organizations on the basis of social and economic realities, and with a real understanding of changing "national character."

Taken together, these essays on the workplace, changing values, and leadership characteristics provide complementary perspectives on the evolving responsibilities of leadership.

Changing the Shape of Work: Reform in Academe

By Rosabeth Moss Kanter

New circumstances demand new attention to the university as employer and workplace. In prosperous times, institutions of all kinds can get by without considering the quality of their organizations or the kinds of jobs and work experience they provide for people. With automatic expansion, promotions are available and people can stretch to fit new jobs for which there are no precedents. That process of enlarging existing jobs is the way many academic administrators experience opportunity. Career prospects open up because they suddenly find their functions expanding, and they have to grow to keep up with them (Scott, 1978).

However, when times are less prosperous there is no institution which can afford the luxury of failing to pay attention to its quality as an organization. What can we say about the quality of education—the primary mission of colleges and universities—when faculty are demoralized, when administrators feel over-burdened and under-appreciated, and when avoiding crises is the role of educational leaders? Colleagues and I asked 25 top administrators, including college and university presidents, what they found most satisfying about their jobs. A very few said formulating policy. The primary list of elements of job satisfaction included such activities as: averting disaster, saving blood, retaining funding levels, rescuing the system from financial disaster, avoiding cutbacks, and resolving hard differences constructively (Kanter and Wheatley, 1978). How many people would be highly motivated to get up and go to work everyday, knowing that they were to face those kinds of things?

Studies do show that when people employed in colleges and universities are asked how satisfied they are with their jobs, most say that on the whole they are very satisfied (Solmon & Tierney, 1977). However, those findings ought to be considered cautiously; most people report on surveys that they are satisfied with their *own* jobs, but when asked how satisfied the average person is in that job, satisfaction rates drop considerably (Kanter, 1978:53). Most people are unwilling or unlikely to admit on surveys that they themselves may have made a bad choice or are doing something that they don't find satisfying, but they are willing to guess that everybody else in their position is dissatisfied. If one looks at what surveys show about specific areas people find *unsatisfying* in the administrative ranks of colleges and universities, the answer often has to do with opportunity of one kind or another: the chance for change, for advancement, or for personal and professional development. Such findings provide impetus for considering the quality of the jobs and work experiences that colleges and universities provide for their employees.

The Opportunity Structure

To show what academic jobs do to people as well as for people, I will apply a framework that I've developed in research on the corporation to the academic workplace. Opportunity and power stemming from jobs and from organizational circumstances are critical to motivation and leadership effectiveness (Kanter, 1977). Opportunity is defined only partly in terms of advancement; it also involves challenges and increase in influence, skill, and pay. (Most people still work for money, not for love, despite myths to the contrary.) However, because of the way many institutions are organized, it is often difficult to feel a sense of challenge, acquire more pay or influence, or develop more skills if one is not somehow still moving up the career ladder. Often that is as true for faculty as it is for people in other kinds of positions.

Opportunity is structured; there are paths and tracks. In academic institutions, the paths are often fuzzy. They are often vaguely defined, so that people generally do not know, in many middle-level positions, what the next rung on the ladder is. However, it is still clear that there are different *kinds* of tracks and that it is often difficult for people to cross from one track to another. A few jobs offer a great deal of opportunity, the sense of a long chain of growth prospects. But most jobs in academic workplaces tend to have very short ladders. Thus, depending on the amount of opportunity stemming from a position, people can be roughly grouped into two major categories: the "moving" and the "stuck." One of the favorite expressions used in corporations to describe people who are advancing in their jobs very quickly is "water walker"—this term captures the experience of the superstar, who is increasingly rare in the academy. The superstar has job prospects and long career growth ahead.

Many people are beginning to find themselves "stuck" in the academic workplace; unfortunately, this comes just as we anticipate an era of even more "stuckness." How do people get "stuck" in the academy? The first way that people get stuck is that their jobs, by design or accident, have a low ceiling for advancement—short ladders and few, if any clear paths or next steps. Even in the faculty ranks, for example, incumbents may reach their final appointment level at a fairly young age and may anticipate staying there for a period of decades, especially if the ban on mandatory retirement continues.

Career Tracks in Administration

There are four career tracks that can be identified in academic administration (Kanter and Wheatley, 1978), and they all tend to have characteristics peculiar to academic jobs. The first is the faculty track. The faculty route into administration

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is noteworthy because people are eligible because of one set of criteria, yet the work they have to do uses another unrelated set of skills. Nevertheless, the faculty track is still primarily the route into certain kinds of jobs, whether or not it qualifies people for those jobs.

The second track, which has limited mobility prospects, consists of lower middle-management jobs that require technical skills. Those jobs have been proliferating over the past 20 years. Increasingly, the people in them find themselves stuck, because top leaders say "I don't want to know the technical details myself, that is why I hire experts." Thus, the better the technical experts get at doing what they are doing, the more likely it is that they will remain adjuncts to top leaders of an institution.

For higher middle-management jobs one often needs to have both faculty credentials and some technical expertise. This combination is increasingly rare, unless people have first "paid their faculty dues" by being productive scholars and gaining tenure.

On the fourth track are the top leadership positions. It is almost impossible, for several reasons, to identify what kinds of paths lead people to such jobs as president, academic vice-president, or chief administrative officer. First, what would qualify people in one institution might disqualify them in another. Top leadership structures have a tendency to seek balance, so that if they take people for one job out of a particular field, they would look for somebody for a neighboring leadership job from a quite different field. As with faculty, we found that the skills it takes to *do* the job are quite different from the skills it took to be *eligible* for the job. The skills of a top leader these days, when politics are increasingly important in the academy, are skills that a political leader would have: salesmanship, negotiation, and mediation (Kanter and Wheatley, 1978). They are capabilities for which neither technical tracks nor faculty tracks are likely to prepare people.

Institutional structures may become more like the Eiffel Tower than a pyramid—very flat on the bottom and tall and thin as it gets higher. This could lead to increasing frustration and discontent in the wake of promotion freezes and economic cutbacks.

The Opportunity Problem

Characteristic of nearly every job in the academy, then, is a sense that the ladders are short, and that it is difficult to cross from one to another. Salary curves, too, are extremely flat in the academy compared to the corporation. Thus, many employees experience a low ceiling on advancement, with crossover between areas uncommon, switching fields difficult, and long tenure in one position likely. Growth for many people in administrative ranks tends to come about through the expansion of their functions under and around them, rather than from promotions; or "growth" is symbolized by a change in title after many years as recognition for long service, but again, not necessarily through promotions or a challenging new assignment (Scott, 1978). And most academic institutions have few developmental activities for faculty and staff, which also reinforces the sense of low ceiling and early, dead end.

The frustration level of people who get stuck this way is not necessarily very high. Why? Because everybody else in similar jobs is in the same situation, and they were led not to expect anything particularly different (Kanter, 1977, Chapter 6). However, additional sources of stuckness cause the frustration levels to rise.

The second way people get stuck is because they reach the jobs that usually have opportunity, but they get there the wrong way. That is, they come up the wrong ladder and then can no longer cross over to another field. They reach a level at which other people in similar jobs would be eligible for higher positions, but they themselves lack some critical background factor that they cannot go back and attain, which means they also cannot move on. This might happen in institutions which prefer to give higher-level jobs to people with connections to that institution; in that case, highly competent middle managers are perhaps seen as ineligible for top leadership positions because they are not alumni, because they have no historical ties to the institution, or because they were promoted from a non-traditional area because of affirmative action pressures. For such people, the frustration level is a little higher, because everybody else in similar positions seems to be eligible for growth, but they are not. So, on the one hand, the institution says, in effect, "Be grateful. You've gotten further than anybody else like you has ever gotten around here." On the one hand, they *are* grateful. On the other hand, they are still stuck; there is no way to go any further.

The third way people get stuck is because of the pyramid squeeze. Even academic institutions, despite the highly decentralized nature of faculties, still tend to have pyramidal administrative ranks. Thus, if there are only a few challenging leadership positions to go around, then no matter how good someone might be at their job in one institution the nature of the pyramid can prevent them from moving into higher-level positions. There are fewer higher-level openings to go around at any one institution than there are people who feel themselves eligible by qualifications or skill. So those people also get stuck. In the corporate world, this is an increasing problem. One company in New York feels that all of its middle managers are virtually "stacked up over LaGuardia in a holding pattern waiting to land as soon as somebody vacates a position." I sometimes feel that way about the academic workplace as well: junior faculty pushing each other (and their senior colleagues) to take jobs elsewhere so as to vacate a position. They know there is no room for them unless there is a slot. This hovering, vulture-like atmosphere is new—at least in magnitude and pervasiveness.

The pyramid squeeze is making everybody very conscious of another source of stuckness in times of economic slowdown. Here the frustration level is potentially very high because there are more people who do feel eligible for higher-level jobs than will probably ever get them. They are the people who in times of plenty would advance, would move into tenured slots or upper-grade administrative ranks. But they are not going to anymore because the pyramid is narrowing. Institutional structures may become more like the Eiffel Tower than a pyramid—very flat on the bottom and tall and thin as it gets higher. This could lead to increasing frustration and discontent in the wake of promotion freezes and economic cutbacks. This can be the source of poor institutional morale.

Furthermore, under these conditions institutions cannot live up to their social responsibilities. When Wheatley and I questioned 400 women in academic administration about the barriers to their career progress and how they saw their own futures in administration, we found that the women who perceived fewest barriers to their career progress were not responding on the basis of attitudes or personal characteristics; they saw barriers or their absence primarily in terms of institutional opportunity. *Discrimination* was not the issue for these women—*jobs* were. The fewest barriers were perceived by women at institutions that still had expanding growth patterns or that were developing new management policies and practices (such as staff development, career-path clarification and performance appraisal)—in short, in institutions that were still "growing" by innovating even if they were not growing in size.

When people see growth prospects close to them in their institution, they start disengaging.

The Moving and the Stuck

Lack of opportunity—"stuckness"—has impact on behavior and attitudes (detailed in Kanter, 1977). The moving—the few superstars—and the stuck behave very differently and act differently as members of the organization. The first impact opportunity has is on aspirations. People develop their ambitions in light of the realistic possibility to have their ambitions realized. It is only the moving who can afford to set high goals, who can afford to be ambitious and achievement oriented. The stuck, regardless of how they got stuck, tend to lower their aspirations. For faculty, for example, this could result in such behaviors as loss of enthusiasm, and consequently poor role modeling for students. Opportunity turns out to be such an important part of the development of an achievement orientation that most of us actually have to see ourselves in a position before we want to get there. That is, we have to see the paths open for us to get to the position before we develop the aspiration for it. I call this the "Gerald Ford Syndrome." Like Ford, most of us actually have to *be* president before we want to run for president. In that sense, opportunity is extremely important in arousing the desire to even try for a particular position. To take another example (a bit tongue-in-cheek), when Hanna Gray, the new President of the University of Chicago, became Provost at Yale five years ago, she was asked by reporters, "Do you have presidential ambitions?", and she said "no." Last summer, *Time* reporters again interviewed her, reminding her what she had said four years earlier, and inquired, "What made the difference?" And she said, "Being asked, I guess." Of course, if people are not being asked anymore, then we cannot expect to find workers in the academic workplace with very high aspirations or achievement drives.

Secondly, opportunity also affects self-esteem. The moving tend to develop a very high estimate of their own skills and abilities. They tend to think that because they are still sought after, they must still be deserving. It is very American, of course, to want to take personal credit for our successes and blame ourselves for our failures. The feeling that one can do anything is associated with the willingness to take risks; these are attitudes instilled in people who are still moving, who still have opportunities. The stuck, on the other hand, tend to lower their self esteem, to see and use fewer skills, to become cautious and conservative, unwilling to take risks, favoring instead the safe strategy. Young scholars in my field today often seem afraid to take an intellectual risk; they instead try to learn the formula for getting published in the standard journals to make sure they have acceptable, if unimaginative articles making up a long list of publications. Thus, for faculty, this combination of low aspiration and self-esteem can result in staying with safe research areas, fear of trying new areas and approaches, and sometimes failure to produce because it seems too risky. An institution that is plagued with low-opportunity people will often experience a collective loss of self-esteem, whereby students and faculty do not value themselves or the status of the institution because it no longer seems to be a place where people are growing.

The third impact opportunity has is on people's sense of connection to work. The moving become very strongly work-engaged because they see their investment paying off. The moving, in fact, sometimes turn into workaholics because they become so attached to work that they forget there is a rest of life which is also important. Is the "work ethic" dead in America? I don't think we ever really had a "work ethic" in quite the way the label suggests. It is not as though people several decades ago enjoyed hard work for its own sake more than people do today; instead, what I think they had was a "progress ethic"—a sense that hard work would pay off in future gains, if not for oneself then at least for one's children. But stuckness breeds the feeling that hard work is not necessarily going to get us anywhere. What I think is lost is the sense of progress as an automatic part of adult life.

Thus, whereas the moving still have a sense of progress that connects them strongly to the work they do, the stuck often disengage. Disengagement takes a variety of forms. It might take the form of high turnover in some administrative jobs. By and large, we can predict that the highest turnover will occur in two very different kinds of positions: either in stuck pockets of the organization, or in those few slots for the superstars who receive good offers and frequently change jobs. For most people, stuckness is associated with seeking escape, seeking opportunity elsewhere. Many people who are stuck become psychic drop-outs who dream of escape, even if they cannot presently leave their safe position. They symbolically "retire on the job" rather than waiting to retire later. (This may be a growing problem as colleges and universities have to change their retirement policies. Sometimes they feel that many of their workers have *already* retired and the issue is not to keep them but to move them aside so as to keep the employees for whom there is still a sense of growth.)

The form of disengagement varies in different parts of the work world. For blue collar workers, for example, the dream of escape might be to run a gas station, a small business (see Kanter, 1977). For women in clerical jobs, the dream of escape might be to run a family. For people in middle-management jobs inside the university, as well as in some faculty jobs in the university, the dream of escape increasingly might be to start a little consulting business on the side.

In short, when people see growth prospects close to them in their institution, they start disengaging. One consequence could be that they become inaccessible to students or other faculty and staff—for example, by spending too much time

off campus in other pursuits, such as professional association meetings or consulting. Professional association memberships can become more important to people as a source of growth, challenge, and recognition when they feel things are closed off to them in their own institution.

The fourth consequence of stuckness involves relationships. Whereas the moving are likely to keep their political alliances alive and still look up, become concerned about the big picture in their organization, what the decisionmakers are doing and thinking, the stuck tend to fall back on protective peer groups or outside sources of esteem. The stuck tend to develop cliques that say, in effect, "Success doesn't matter. Achievement doesn't matter. The job isn't that important. What is important is we are good fellows with one another" (Kanter, 1977). This is one way, of course, that we all protect our sense of esteem and dignity when the institution or career no longer provides growth prospects. But this can also reflect a form of dropping out from connection with what is going on in the rest of the institution, of becoming insular.

Finally, stuckness also tends to affect how people handle their grievances or dissatisfactions. Most people find some things unsatisfying about their work lives from time to time. But the moving and the stuck handle their concerns very differently. The moving are likely to engage in active, constructive forms of protest; they are likely to organize to get something done; they are likely to make a constructive change because they feel decisionmakers will listen to them—that they can have an impact. The stuck are the ones who turn into the petty gripers from the sidelines, the subtle saboteurs who knock down everybody else's constructive ideas but don't have any ideas themselves. Many of us recognize this attitude in ourselves when we are frustrated, not growing and not listened to. Thus, the people who are stuck might be the ones who block committee work, who resist innovations, and who make life more difficult for each other because they are unwilling to cooperate. They could also be the people most vulnerable to unionization efforts. People who are stuck, who might fail to see any prospect for personal progress, might also feel that all they can do is organize to bargain to improve their current situations, because their positions are not going to change, nor will they ever be part of the leadership coalition of their institution.

The Power Structure

The second basic set of issues concerns power. I define power in a deliberately value-neutral way: not as domination or tyranny or control, but as the capacity to act, to get things done, to get the resources you need to do your job. One of the reasons many administrators tell me that they feel powerless around colleges and universities is because they can't always get access to the people, the information or the resources they need to really do their jobs well. Those things are the essence of organizational power: having open lines of supply, support, and information.

The way power is structured in organizations differs from the more official ladders and tracks defining opportunity. Power is often structured informally as well as formally. It may have less to do with job titles or levels than with patterns of power—such as big wheels and inner circles—and being close to the action. Some people are more powerful than others, even in terms of access to the tools to do their jobs well. But the powerful seem increasingly rare. I have interviewed very few top leaders who feel they have power any more (Kanter and Stein, 1979: Section I). In times of decline a sense of powerlessness begins to pervade the whole institution. There is a sense that the number of the powerful who still feel they have sufficient control over their environments to get the resources to get things done is diminishing.

What identifies the powerless? The powerless, for example, are the ones in administrative jobs who lack recognition inside the organization, who have the knowledge but are not listened to, who feel constantly bypassed in decisions—who think that their area or department is not sufficiently taken into account when higher-level decisions are made. They are the people who feel personally powerless because every time there is a complaint someone goes above their head to the supervisor, and they never have a chance to work it out themselves. (This can happen to women and minorities who lack sufficient backing from their institution; of whom it can be said, in effect, "those people aren't important; I don't have to go to them; I'll go over their heads."

It is important, then, to understand how people gain power to get things done in an institution. Power is accumulated in two kinds of ways. One is through the organization of jobs, and the other is through political alliances. I will start with the jobs themselves to counter popular accounts of career success, which make it sound as though all it takes to get ahead is to go out to lunch with the right people to plot the next career move. They never sound as though anybody is actually *working* at something they have to do to earn their pay. Yet the kinds of jobs that people are working at, how jobs are structured and located in the organization, is an important key to power.

The Organization of Jobs

There are three criteria jobs should meet to help people in them gain institutional or organizational power (Kanter, 1977). The first is that they permit activities that are extra-ordinary, that call for the exercise of discretion, planning, and innovation. That is why many of today's top leaders have such power; they were able to be pioneers, to create new areas or develop programs. But in times when resources are no longer available for innovation, most people become administrators of the routine rather than people who can do the out-of-the-ordinary. When people administer the routine, credit for their achievements always has to be shared with whoever planned that perfect routine. Nobody becomes particularly powerful or feels particularly powerful in an organization when he or she comes out of a routinized job subject to rules and regulations.

The people currently emerging as superstars or top leaders are still in positions to pioneer. For example, they develop a job that is totally new to the organization. A university that never had personnel systems, for instance, might suddenly find that its affirmative-action officer knows something useful; that person gets to develop a new area, and can still become quickly powerful, as occurred in one large state university system. Top leaders in any organization are by definition the ones that are doing the things that cannot be programmed. However, when people are feeling powerless they are more likely to fall back on those safe, secure routines that make one feel good—because one can have a short-term accomplishment and at least know the papers are all in order, or that

the leak is fixed in the faculty club, or that the heat is up in classrooms. Yet, it is those kinds of routine activities that keep people from doing the things that will give them impact in the institution (Bennis, 1976).

The second criteria activities have to meet to help people become powerful is that they be visible—recognized and known, their contributions measured and identified, so that it is possible to single out *individuals* as responsible for contributing to the life of the institution. In many institutions of higher education, some people are buried and unknown, particularly administrators. In larger institutions, administrators and faculty may not be known to one another. Accomplishments tend to be hidden; they tend to be buried inside a single department or a single work unit rather than known and recognized across boundaries. But those people whose accomplishments are known and noticed are the ones who are likely to become powerful—asked to join every committee, given budgetary extensions more readily, or asked for a quote in the campus newspaper on issues that are timely.

Finally, the third criteria for power is that the work activities be relevant. It is possible to be simultaneously out-of-the-ordinary, visible, and "off-the-wall," as it is put colloquially. It is not enough just to be odd and known. The activities that people engage in in their jobs must be relevant to solving pressing problems of the institution. In higher education, as in any set of organizations, those pressing problems shift from era to era in different economic circumstances and markets, with different fields becoming prominent. For this reason, the people who are contributing to handling the critical contingencies of the institution are those who are likely to become powerful.

But not all jobs allow people to contribute to the pressing problems of the organization. Aside from faculty, few people are asked to solve the problems of the institution if they do not happen to be in the relevant functional area at the moment, even though they might have the skills. It tends to be the person who finds himself or herself with the right skills in the right position at the right moment that becomes powerful. For example, several years ago a junior clerk in a personnel office in a state university was told to "Spend 10 percent of your time learning something about labor law. We aren't busy, so why don't you take the time to learn this?" As one might guess, this nonessential area soon became very relevant when staff members unionized. Suddenly this junior clerk was one of the few people in the institution who knew anything about the relevant problem. She was brought into the leadership coalition very quickly, had access to committees and decisions, and was consulted on other matters. She was recognized and her power was boosted by virtue of sitting on a relevant area.

Political Alliances

The second side of power *is* the political side of power that involves symbolically or actually going to lunch with the right people. One source of alliances that contributes to power is sponsorship. "Mentoring" is an over-used concept because not very many people have been privileged enough to be the proteges of great persons who took them by the hand, walked them through the institution, taught them everything they knew, gave them the desk next door, and promoted them constantly. Most people, in fact, have a wider range of contacts that contribute to their own power through giving advice, information, or encouragement. Sponsors may not even have a very close relationship to the recipient; advice or backing might be occasional and casual.

Sponsors can serve to deflect criticism, e.g., when one is criticized in a meeting that one cannot personally attend. Sponsors, we found, are also those that handle the people who are going to block your creative ideas; or they are the people who might hire you for anticipated rather than demonstrated skills, who are willing to take a chance (Kanter and Wheatley, 1978). They are a source of endorsements, or of inside information about the institution. Thus, most people who are powerful have a wide range of contacts with more senior people. They do not have a single mentor; they have many people serving sponsorship functions.

In the academy, job evaluations tend to be subjective. Most institutions do not have very objective means of performance appraisal. It is for that reason, of course, that the courts have failed to find in favor of plaintiffs in most discrimination suits involving academic work; it is much harder to prove discrimination when the standards are so subjective. By definition, most sponsorship systems in most academic institutions at the moment are informal, subjective, and have to do with the personal whim or preference of the leader, based on everything from social similarity and comfort to backing an acknowledged "star." Most organizations do not have routine ways for junior people to come into contact with the more senior people as explicit sources of advice, information, and encouragement.

The next source of power through alliances is, of course, peers. Colleagues make many decisions in academic organizations. Thus, to coin a phrase, "if people are not in with their peers, they may be out on their ears." Search committees, for example, were identified by some of the women in our sample of academic administrators as possible sources of bias, sources that are often unexamined. To what extent do search committees really conduct open searches rather than have preferred candidates at the beginning? To what extent are peers making fair decisions about people in general? This is a source of tension in the academy, of course, because on the one hand one wants to uphold the right of colleagues to make judgments; on the other hand, this tends to create problems for otherwise competent people who are not getting along with those peers.

Networks are another source of power. Peer networks are not used as personal support mechanisms for women any more than for men; but they do turn out to be vehicles for getting more power at the institutions. For the most part, networks tend to be functional or job related. Most people find it difficult to form networks with people in other fields or other departments or units. There are two kinds of networks that seem to be important in academic life, and they operate very differently. On the national scale, networks such as professional associations seem to serve office-holders particularly as sources of prestige, or to provide job endorsements for people. Localized institutional networks seem to be very important for people in not only providing job-related information and gossip, but also in helping them learn to do their jobs. In a study that colleagues and I conducted for the Carnegie Corporation on training programs for academic administrators (Kanter and Wheatley, 1978), we found that most people enjoyed the skills they learned from their training programs but they said the real learning came on the job, and

that the real trainers, the real teachers and developers of talent, were likely to be their peers rather than even their managers or bosses. They were likely to be comparable people doing similar jobs in either the home institution or others.

Last, people develop power through developing the talents and prospects of others, through their subordinates. There is not enough explicit attention paid to the development of managerial talent at universities—let alone faculty talent. People are often left to learn essential skills on their own, and therefore are not always in a position to enhance their own power by passing these skills on, by developing their own team, by developing confident people who can follow in their footsteps and also contribute to the life of the institution.

The challenge is to find ways to enhance opportunity and to empower more people in institutions that are not likely to grow.

The Powerful and the Powerless

Power, like opportunity, is important for behavior and attitudes. The powerful, by and large, get more cooperation more easily. Studies show that people are generally more deferent, more willing to cooperate and make life easier for people who are seen as having power. In laboratory experiments that arbitrarily give leaders different amounts of power on a random basis, we find again that those people who have the tools to reward and are thus seen as having clout or impact are the ones who get cooperation. But the powerless get resistance; the powerless get griping; the powerless get complaints. One of the negative consequences of organizational powerlessness is petty tyranny or domination. I argue that just as lack of opportunity ("stuckness") makes people ineffective, so does powerlessness. In part, *powerlessness* corrupts in academic institutions. Many of the negative leadership and administrative traits that we all fear and shudder at tend to be consequences of powerlessness (Kanter, 1979). The powerless boss, for example, is the one who is likely to keep his or her people bottled up, spending most of the time doing nothing, but making sure no one has stolen the paper clips.

Organizational powerlessness is accompanied by the tendency to be too controlling, to supervise too closely, and to reward mediocrity rather than rewarding talent (Kanter, 1977: Chapter 8). Faculty who feel powerless are perhaps the most likely to turn down potential superstars for tenure, because they feel uncomfortable or threatened by talent and by the implied comparison. Powerless supervisors tend to hold back their people in a variety of ways rather than rewarding innovation and risk-taking. And they tend to be extremely and excessively rules-minded. People experiencing powerlessness—those who are not in the networks, who are not sponsored, who have routinized jobs—tend to focus on their one tool or weapon, their one source of power, which is generally the rules. "You don't have to cooperate with me because I am powerful, but I can certainly call you on the rules and regulations. I can make sure you do it according to form."

Furthermore, powerless administrators also tend to become territorial. They will find a turf, stake it out, and compete with all other territories in the organization, playing "king of the mountain." Those who are not influential, who do not have impact on the larger life of the institution, come to feel that when other people are on their ground, the others should do things the way they want them done. That elevates the importance of that territory, their domain. Perhaps it is a sense of powerlessness that makes faculty, for example, pull back from interdisciplinary programs and retreat to their disciplines when times are tight, and that makes departments war with each other for scarce funds. It is a sense of not being able to have impact on the institution in other ways that makes people decide they will at least protect their own territory.

Thus, powerlessness, like stuckness, tends to create not only a demoralized atmosphere, but also ineffective workers who contribute less than they could and often suffer from low self-esteem. The challenge is to find ways to enhance opportunity and to empower more people in institutions that are not likely to grow.

Creating Opportunity and Power

Some of the ways organizations can work on these issues of opportunity and power include:

- Developing clearer career paths in which there are attainable next steps in a career chain. Even if the functional area or level does not change, the person can anticipate and prepare himself/herself for a next step that still involves growth and challenging assignments using more skills. (See also Scott, 1978.)

- Developmental activities that deepen the sense of mastery of job-related skills. This incentive leads to greater contribution from and use of the person and does not require formal promotions—it "pays off" for the individual in more remuneration for each skill mastered.

- Job sharing, job rotation, and other schemes that "expand" the number of possible openings and placements.

- Lateral transfers and other ways to build bridges that allow people to transfer from one functional area to another. This could enable people to cross fields, and at least move laterally if they are not moving vertically.

- More frequent and explicit use of temporary assignments, outside service, and other ways in which people can get a sense of opportunity and challenge even temporarily, despite the fact that their permanent jobs might not change. (It is important to note that this, like some other suggestions for reform, is already available to some faculty under some circumstances, but rarely extends to administrators or gets seen as a deliberate opportunity-expanding policy.)

- Involvement of more layers of the institution in goal-setting and planning (Cyert, 1975).

- Systems of "internal proposals" in which "requests for proposals" (RFPs) on relevant, pressing problems areas go out from top leaders to all organization members, who can then form a team to bid on the job, with release time appropriately negotiated if needed. This can dramatically expand access to sources of organizational power, as well as provide innovative solutions to real problems.

• More explicit recognition of the work of administrators and attempts to make them known and valued by faculty and students in large institutions.

• Attention to building relationships among more senior and junior personnel. This could take the form of a deliberate pairing of "old hands" (or tenured faculty) with organizational newcomers (or junior faculty). The latter would gain the benefits of sponsorship systems, and these in turn might move from hidden, informal, or accidental to more accessible and fair.

• Formal reward and recognition for those who are good "people managers," who develop and nurture talent in their midst.

These are just a few ways that academic organizations might create more opportunity and power, so that they can unglue the stuck and empower the powerless. They should do so in the hope and expectation that even in times of economic uncertainty, colleges and universities can be exciting places to work, places that are vital and alive because of their people.

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Changing Values: Implications for Major Social Institutions

By Morton Darrow

Not very long ago, members of my tribe of futurists were forecasting the imminent advent of the Post-Industrial Society in which academia, as part of the knowledge industry, would be the dominant institution in America, shadowing the corporation and government. In this scenario academicians, as formulators and as guardians of theoretical knowledge, would flit back and forth between universities, corporations and business, guiding and leading them. Today that forecast seems ironic in light of the current plight facing education.

Though this has not been my personal forecast, my credibility no doubt suffers some guilt by association. Nor is it likely that my credibility with academic people is increased by my identity with the corporate world. From the outset, therefore, I want to state my conclusion that we in large corporations share a common destiny with those in higher education. I offer as proof a list of the major long-term challenges facing American business, which I developed in response to a Conference Board request a few years ago. The list has been modified by substitution of higher education terms *(italicized)* for the parenthetical original business terms, as shown below.

(1) Coping with continued government pressure to extend its authority over *educational activities* (private-enterprise economic activities).

(2) Creating self-renewal mechanisms and techniques in *institutions of higher learning* (the business enterprise) to encourage adaptability to major social changes.

(3) Creating new technologies and expanding job opportunities for *both faculties and student bodies* (a highly diverse labor force).

(4) Organizing, directing and motivating *higher education institutions* (the business enterprise employees including management) to adjust to the expansion of knowledge and the erosion of authority.

(5) Meeting the public demands for broadened goals for *educational institutions* (the business enterprise-social responsibility)—without rendering the enterprise ineffectual in its *learning and teaching* (economic) functions and its survivability.

(6) Developing long-range *educational* (business) plans and operating in the face of uncertainties regarding:

- Inflation
- Market mechanisms
- Societal needs
- Governmental policies

(7) Anticipating and coping with *increased pressures for accountability* (institutionalized consumerism) from governmental and voluntary organizations.

(8) Filling and expanding *societal* (consumer) demands for better quality *graduates (skills and knowledge) and more responsible citizens (civilization and ethics)* (personal services and highly differentiated goods).

(9) Coping with the vulnerability of *educational institutions* (business enterprises) to coercion and disruption arising from:

- Deterioration of urban institutions
- Spread of violence and terror
- Breakdown of trust and honesty
- Revival of 1960s militancy

(10) Anticipating and contending with increasing "democratic-humanistic" pressures on traditional, hierarchical *educational institutions* (business enterprises) having an impact on:

- The power of the *institution* (business)
- Decision-making within the *institution* (enterprise)
- *Faculty, administration, student, trustee rights and obligations* (shareholder, manager, employee, consumer rights)
- Job structures
- Character of *faculty and student bodies* (workforce)
- Vested authority and leadership
- Women and minorities in *teaching and administrative ranks* (executive ranks)

The challenges are common because neither institution can isolate itself from the broad social trends which are buffeting all major institutions.

Attacks on Major Institutions

A comparison of the two major institutions which give America its distinctive flavor—government and business—should demonstrate the point. Both are under attack and both have shown huge losses in public confidence during the past decade.

Little of the attack has focused on the institutional ends. In the case of corporate business, these ends are: producing goods and services, earning a profit, and self-preservation. In the case of democratic government, the ends are: preserving the peace, safeguarding individual freedom, ensuring justice, and promoting the general welfare. There remains wide acceptance of these ends even as confidence levels fall.

Rather, the attacks have focused on the institutional means. The means of liberal democracy that are under attack are:

- *Representative government*—Attacks from those elements stressing participatory democracy and from those calling for direct rule by initiative and referendum.

- *Rule of law*—Attacks from officeholders who obey the higher law of national security and from those advocating civil disobedience in the name of conscience or natural law.

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Table 1. Confidence in Leadership of Business and Government, 1966-1978

	1966	1972	1973	1974	1976	Nov. 1977	Aug. 1978
Big Business	55%	27%	29%	21%	16%	23%	22%
U.S. Congress	42	21	29	18	9	15	10

Source: National Opinion Research Center surveys

• *Majority rule*—Attacks from those seeking new constitutional barriers to government action and from those moving political questions into the courts for decision by judicial fiat.

• *Minority rights*—Attacks from those forces focusing on the narrowing of property rights and from those who are attacking under the banner of eliminating decadence, obscenity and immorality.

• *Party system*—Attacks from officeholders ensconced in bureaucracies or constituencies providing independent sources of strength and from those seeking to purify the system through procedural reforms or through establishment of greater party-ideological identification.

Similarly, the institutional means of corporate business have been under wide-ranging attacks. These means, never as clearly articulated as those of government, have formed an industrial paradigm around which some basic value clusters were formed. The means and the attacks are:

• *Growth*—Attacks from advocates of limited growth, balanced growth, zero growth and negative growth. The growth phenomenon, treated to several centuries of positive organic analogies and of the appellation "healthy," acquired a new harsh label from the critics—"cancerous."

• *Exploitation of nature*—With attacks from ecologists, environmentalists, and neo-pantheists have come demands to stop treating the earth and its resources as goods created for man's consumption, and to restore a pre-industrial (and mythical) harmony of man and nature.

• *Application of science and technology to economic process*—Attacks from a broad spectrum of critics, including many within the scientific community. The ancient Egyptians and Chinese identified science with religion and the sacred, and economic process with the secular and the profane. The mix of science and the economic process was blasphemous. Modern critics stress that human survival needs override potential economic gain; this is demonstrated by their demands for stopping recombinant DNA research and the building and operation of nuclear-energy plants.

• *Market-mechanism*—Attacks from those wishing to restore the time-honored mechanism of political allocation to decide who gets what in society, rather than letting the market decide.

While the attackers of the institutional means of corporate business have had relatively few material successes, their voices—amplified by modern communications media—have created for many in society a self-consciousness and self-doubt about the future of America as a business civilization.

A fundamental factor pushing doubt into loss of confidence is the doctrine of indivisibility, held by many attackers and also by many defenders of corporate business. They agree that if any one of the institutional means fails or is drastically altered, the entire system fails. One hears from both classical Marxists and from conservative economists, for example, that without growth the private-enterprise market mechanism must fail, because it is an inherently unstable system requiring continuous expansion. Similar arguments apply to each of the other institutional means. Public confidence in institutions' future is shaken by the seeming agreement that the system is no stronger than its weakest part, whichever one of the four elements that might be—growth, exploitation of nature, application of science and technology, and the market mechanism.

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Social Causes of Institutional Unrest

Public confidence in higher education also has been shaken in recent years. But, as with government and business, many of the problems and the attacks on higher education should be viewed in this broader context of societal developments rather than as the result of any unique institutional failure.

The following argument deals with three broad questions, posed in the naive manner that best fits our stereotype of a business executive. The questions are:

- Why are all major institutions of modern, scientific/technological societies under attack?
- Will the attacks continue?
- What can leaders do within a liberal-democratic framework?

Increased Rationality

My central hypothesis is that the main cause of institutional unrest lies in the value changes associated with *increased*

rationality. But first I would like to offer my explanation of how rationality has increased in spite of growing interest in mysticism, cults and astrology.

Lord Chesterfield, man of the Age of Reason, tried to tell his son why rational man sometimes behaved irrationally. We, children of the Age of Freud, need to explain why irrational man sometimes behaves rationally, though I see no inherent contradiction in that situation. We can accept man as "flawed" by the human condition of complete dependence of the infant at birth and of the infant's need for socialization to survive. The infant performs a random act and is rewarded by the all-powerful protectors with love and affection. Another random act is deemed dangerous by the protectors and there is withdrawal of love, even punishment. The infant's reciprocal love is turned to hate, but such feelings can't be sustained against the all-powerful. Fear creates anxiety and love-hate arouses guilt. The infant matures carrying the young seedlings of fear, love, hate, anxiety and guilt into adulthood.

In maturity, therefore, all of us are by forces possessed that can cause irrational behavior when aroused. Most of us, however, are also capable of using rationality in a sustained manner. By rationality, I mean the scientific method of gathering facts (including such "facts" as feelings, attitudes and values), developing hypotheses, testing for pragmatic truths, and determining the optimal thesis. It was this rational scientific method that did much to transform traditional society as individuals and groups, working under common assumptions, developed powerful "proofs" and built knowledge systems that went beyond intuition or individual artful efforts.

Lest I be accused of being by rationality possessed, I will discuss later some limitations to scientific method and I will acknowledge now that viewed across the breadth of the possibilities open to man, rationality has had limited application in human affairs.

Nevertheless, it is to the fundamental question underlying rationality, the asking of "Why?", that I attribute marked changes in institution-values relationships during the last three decades. My personal experience exemplifies the changes. I was brought up in a traditional family. When my father told me to do something, I was punished if I asked, "Why?". The question was viewed as a sign of disrespect for authority. Twenty years later, I brought my son up to ask "Why?", not only of me but of all other authority.

When the value cluster surrounding the inquiring attitude was turned on the vested authority of institutions, the result was an erosion of authority. Every major institution found itself dealing with people unwilling to blindly accept customary responses. Answers that fell back on tradition ("Because we have always done it that way"), or on vested authority ("Because we are telling you"), did not go unchallenged.

Some institutions might have been able to regain authority by demonstrating expertise and accomplishment. But this restoration was not to be because of another manifestation of rationality. A steady stream of hopes and promises was daily fed to people in news reports and advertising. The rational response of people to the tens of thousands of promises made in the mass-communications media by major institutions—political, economic, educational—was to raise people's expectations. Their attempt to legitimate these expectations as entitlements followed shortly. Contrary to the widely proclaimed neo-Conservative thesis, a "new class" did not arise to subvert people from self-reliance to an aberrational Age of Entitlement; rather, it was the confluence of the unfilled promise of liberal democracy and the continued promise of untold riches flowing from the application of science and technology to the production of goods and services that caused expectations about the quality of life and institutional performance to soar much beyond then-current levels. This gap between expectations and performance is measured by the public's low confidence levels and lack of respect for major social institutions today.

Increased Fragmentation

This dissatisfaction with institutional performance caused a lessening of institutional authority which, in turn, caused increased institutional fragmentation under the stresses of the greater complexity of modern, scientific/technological industrial society. This fragmentation phenomenon has not been readily apparent on the American scene for two diverse reasons.

One cause lies in the base from which we start. Compared to Western Europe, the United States has been a casually structured society. The history of educational development illustrates well the extent of casual institutional structuring, when one compares the myriad forms that have evolved in the United States as compared to unitary systems in Europe. The patterns of growth of religion, business and government also attest to this casualness. Further fragmentation tends to get lost against the mosaic background of American institutional development.

The other cause of lowered visibility of fragmentation is that there are contradictory trends operating simultaneously toward greater concentration. And it is greater concentration—in the ownership of daily newspapers, or in the assets of the hundred largest industrial corporations—that receives the limelight.

Nevertheless, a closer examination of one key institution, the family, demonstrates the fragmentation. The decline of traditional authority in the family has been accompanied by new forms of "familying"—cohabitation, homosexual pairings, communes—as well as less spectacular, but perhaps more lasting changes in substance rather than form. The "negotiated" arrangement wherein the man and woman, within the nuclear family form, bargain as equals what their respective familial roles will be has poured new wine into old bottles.

As diverse as the forms that higher education has taken in the United States since 1870, the last thirty years have seen increased fragmentation. The richness of new institutional forms is apparent to one who views the scene from outside the academy. They need not be catalogued.

It should be made clear that the word "fragmented" has been chosen to describe the process in neutral terms. People who like what is going on would use terms such as "free" and "pluralistic"; those disliking the trend would use terms such as "anarchistic" and "divisive." Regardless of terminology employed, there is agreement that institutional fragmentation and the decreased authority of institutions have weakened one of the key roles institutions play—the socialization process of endoctrinating the central values of the society.

As this role has weakened, central values have fragmented, contributing to the further weakening of institutional authority. In many cases this process has been masked by the fact that the old predominant value remains the model choice,

though no longer by a majority. The example of the work ethic should illustrate the process. Thirty years ago, a normal distribution curve could have been used to describe American work-ethic values—at one end, the allergenics for whom work is anathema; in the center, believers of the Protestant work ethic (work is here for man to do and find fulfillment); and at the other end, the workaholics for whom work is life itself. Today, the curve is multi-humped—we still have the allergenics; then a cluster numbering ten to fifteen percent for whom work is evil, coming equally from mystics believing in the primacy of inner knowledge and from those who see the role of technology as freeing people from work; another cluster numbering twenty to twenty-five percent who view work instrumentally as irksome but necessary to acquire desired goods and services; the modal cluster numbering around forty-five percent still subscribing to the Protestant work ethic; another cluster numbering ten to fifteen percent represented largely by technical, professionals and managerial people for whom vocation and avocation blend together in a seamless way; and lastly, a small number of workaholics.

Similar fragmentation could be noted for numerous other central values, including patriotism, as measured by a willingness to kill or die for one's country, motherhood and the role of women, and self-reliance.

Coping With Fragmentation

To accommodate this value fragmentation, we have developed a remarkable social tolerance for the ways in which individuals package and repackage their value bundles. People are bundling in strange and wonderous ways value elements that only a short time ago would have been considered incompatible or incongruous. We are surprised to find corporate executives practicing meditation and believing in the occult, or plumbers collecting fine art. Repeatedly, interpersonal relationships are jarred and communications disrupted by these incongruities, which shatter the old stereotypes built on adherence to centrally held values. A new unpredictability is introduced as we discover that we don't know "where someone is coming from."

In a manner of speaking, the individual, too, has problems knowing where he or she is "coming from," because the fragmentation process has extended to the personality. Daniel Yankelovich summed up the results of decades of research on personality as demonstrating that the chief building blocks of psychological well-being are:

- A sense of self-esteem and conviction of one's worth as an individual;
- A clear-cut sense of identity;
- The ability to believe that one's actions make sense to others as well as to oneself;
- A set of concrete goals and values;
- Feelings of potency and efficacy;
- Enough stimulation to avoid boredom;
- A feeling that one's world is reasonably stable;
- An overall sense of meaning and coherence in one's life.

I believe this listing is a good description not only of psychological well-being, but also of the key elements of an integrated personality. These key elements, in a complex modern society requiring the assumption of numerous roles amidst fragmenting institutions and values, are absent for the overwhelming majority of us.

Most of us would do well to have a set of building blocks of psychological well-being for each of the roles that we play. It takes a special effort to learn to live with our many selves, for we refuse to recognize the extent of this fragmentation process and continue to seek identity—to try to discover the real "me," the authentic personality. We have difficulty accepting the proposition that there may not be a real "me," that we are the totality of our many selves.

This fragmentation—of institutions, values and personality—contributes to the ever-increasing complexity of modern life. Technology and increased population also play a role, but the key factor in the increasing complexity is heightened institutional interdependency. We have long been aware of the way in which changes in one institutional sector have had effects, frequently unforseen, upon other institutions. A classic example is provided by the automobile; the repercussions that this technological innovation has had upon central cities, suburbs, industry and job location, government, housing patterns and pre-marital sex values have been enormous.

The predominant way of handling this bothersome complexity during the first half of this century was to operate under a myth of institutional autonomy. Institutional decision-making and planning were conducted within a set of assumptions predicated on change for that institution, but stability for all other institutions, which were treated as an environmental background. For analytic purposes, change in other institutions could be ignored because it was assumed either to be gradual or because an invisible hand was seen to be guiding progress and institutional adaptation.

The post-World War II period, with its rapid change and complex institutional relationships, shattered this model; decisions and plans based on institutional autonomy were proven dangerous or useless because of "outside forces." A new set of assumptions was developed based on a Newtonian mechanistic model, in which other institutions were conceived as bodies in motion whose direction could be affected by the initiating institution and which could, in turn, affect other institutions. Through a form of vector analysis, such as in technology assessment, it was believed that one could trace and project what effects an anticipated change in one institution would eventually cause throughout the institutional universe.

The inadequacies of this way of thinking have given rise to a third model of institutional interaction based on a biological analogy. In the biological evolutionary model, the institutions are each viewed as purposive, goal-seeking organisms linked directly to each other through numerous sub-systems capable of instantaneous or long-delayed feedback. Purposive or values-directed acts in Institution A are thought to affect Institution B in such a way that feedback to A effectuates a change in A's values and purpose. Superficially, it appears that effect has brought about a change in cause, and to those looking for simple cause-and-effect relationships, the transaction is paradoxical. Thus, for example, over the past two decades the Federal government intensified its regulation of business activities. In addition to causing numerous major changes within the corporation, this regulation resulted in a mobilization of corporate resources and skills for unprecedented political activity. Against the background of continued high inflation, we are now seeing within government a movement toward recapitalizing capitalism, deregulating, and re-

writing the social contract regarding the welfare state. This is a turn of events that was largely unforseeable and which has the potential for affecting other major political values.

We must learn to live with situations in which our performance, no matter how meritorious, is outraced by the expectations of the publics with whom we deal. We must learn to lead in situations in which our control is limited, in which efforts to control will be found counter-productive.

Problems Facing Institutional Leaders

I shall now attempt to identify some of the problems posed for institutional leaders by values fragmentation and systemic values modification. The problems are in the areas of communications and consensus, decision-making and problem-solving.

Leadership is dependent on the capability to marshal followers by communicating appropriate symbols and cues in order to establish consensus. Today's leaders seemingly possess unparalleled technological tools to enhance this capability through instantaneous electronic communications media. Apart from the problem of proliferation of technological jargon, many of the technological advances should have contributed to the strengthening of leadership and consensus. according to earlier seers. Some of the scenarios would by now have had us in the grip of authoritarianism; other scenarios would have placed us further down the road to monolithic totalitarianism. Why then did we arrive, surrounded by technological communications media successes, at the present state of widely recognized "weak leadership" and "lack of consensus?"

My answer lies in the values fragmentation and decline of institutional authority. The authoritarian/totalitarian model was predicated on increased institutional authority, strengthened centrally held values, and greater vested-interest control of communications media content. None of these events transpired. On the contrary, there were diminutions in each area. Today's leaders in democratic societies, thus, find themselves competing with many other voices, continually frustrated in the search for a strong consensus. The phenomena of incongruous value bundles, personae, and non-majority modal values cause leaders problems because leaders really don't understand many of their nominal followers any longer. They have trouble reaching them. Moreover, when they do get their message through, they find themselves in the Sisyphean dilemma of losing or antagonizing existing supporters as items are added to the agenda to attract other support.

Institutional leaders are reduced to choosing between leading broad coalitions with a lightly held values consensus derived from some low common denominator of agreement or obscurity, or of leading minorities with sharply identified positions. It is this situation which gives rise to the flow of single-issue movements into the power vacuum, and to the cry, "Oh where are the great leaders of yesteryear?"

The second set of leadership problems revolves around institutional decision-making and problem-solving. Many years ago, George Santayana wrote in *The Crime of Galileo:*

> The working of great institutions is mainly the result of a vast mass of routine, petty malice, self-interest, carelessness, and sheer mistake. Only a residual fraction is thought.

A reformulation of these ingredients is necessary for our thesis. A great deal of the "working" of complex institutions—the processing, decision-making, and problem-solving—is based on tradition, on standard operating procedures, on a repertoire of previously successful actions. One searches the institutional memory for the appropriate analogue to the situation at hand and the rest is "routine."

If we can continue to take license with Santayana's words, I would identify his phrase "residual fraction [that] is thought" with rationality. And this phrase "self-interest" I broaden to include group interests operating within the institution, such as those of departments, staffs, dioceses and divisions, whose mode is political, involving negotiation or bargaining.

The balance of use of the three methods contained in the Santayana formulation—tradition, rationality and negotiation—varies with time within institutions and also varies between institutions. A corporation, for example, may undergo several changes of chief executive officer within a decade, and with each change experience sharp changes in relative reliance on tradition, rationality and negotiation.

This rather prosaic statement about the changing balance of three methods sounds very commonsensical until we recall the dominant paradigm that has linked knowledge, rationality and purpose for several hundred years in Western civilization. In that Newtonian world-machine model, the credo was that scientific, rational methods would inevitably uncover knowledge of the laws and principles underlying all causes and effects, leading to never-ending intellectual, material and social progress. In the 1960s, this line of thought, enhanced by the spectacular scientific and technological breakthroughs of the previous two decades, emboldened numerous futurists to talk of a post-Industrial society in which would occur not only the aforementioned predominance of knowledge industries, but also the governance of all major institutions by scientific, rational methods. Rationality, guided by the theoretical knowledge of underlying laws of social action, would govern human affairs. Negotiation, tool of partisanship and self-interest, would wither and there would be an "end to ideology." Tradition, too, would fade away as markedly changed conditions made its lessons inapplicable.

Our thesis of changing balance, including the occurrence of greater use of negotiation and decreased use of rationality in institutional decision-making and problem-solving, poses a contradiction for the concept of inevitable growth of rationality. Why aren't more institutional questions resolved by scientific rational methods?

An examination of this question from a corporate perspective may have implications for other institutions. When I was much younger and saw almost everything clearly, I was convinced that businessmen who espoused Adam Smith's views of the world were either extremely naive or were motivated by self-interest and weren't really believers. After almost twenty-five years in the business community, I am convinced that many businessmen have an intuitive view of the world that resembles the biological-evolutionary model of institutional relations described earlier—a world of innumerable,

complex, changing relationships. On any given work day, myriad decisions will have been made throughout the economy to buy, to sell, to invest, to build, to change jobs. Each decision will have been guided by someone's self-interest or group interest and the "invisible hand" of social accommodation.

The modern Smithian does not advocate laissez-faire; he accepts government regulation or control designed to let the market mechanism operate. He does not believe, however, that rationality can be applied to a modern, complex economy, that a model can be constructed leading to an optimal solution of who gets what in a society. Thus, much of his opposition to extension of governmental power to plan, regulate and control is based not merely on self-interest and potential loss of power. It is also based on the perception that government experts and technocrats will be trying to find optimal solutions through rationality in areas where the Smithian thinks they do not exist. No matter how large the computer used or how numerous the data-gatherers, in a dynamic, modern economy, wage-price controls or national economic planning won't work because simultaneously changing value preferences and resource allocations defy a rational, optimal solution. In a Panglossian way, the closest one can come to learning what is best for a society is by contemplating the totality of the millions of individual and group decisions made daily. That which works is best.

Nor is this view held by corporate leaders limited to dealing with government; it carries over to the internal operations of the business. Many of the problems within the business are, therefore, resolved by negotiation—by having the departments, staffs, groups with a vested interest sit down and bargain an agreement. Some management problems do lend themselves to scientific rational methods which are successfully employed for these limited situations. However, nowhere is the effort made to apply rationality to the corporation as a whole. Pragmatic solutions, tradition and limited rationality rule, and optimal concepts are for the most part dismissed.

Leaders of other institutions have shared the feelings of frustration and disappointment linked to institutional incapability to rationalize decision-making and problem-solving. All are muddling through, beset by loss of confidence in their capabilities and by the uncertainty caused by contradictory trends.

In conclusion, higher education may have a number of unique problems, but I repeat, it is my view that most of its major long-term challenges are shared with other institutions. Returning to the enumerated list of challenges with which I started this examination, it should be apparent that the list reflects a view that the trend to fragmentation will continue for at least the next two decades; that value changes are fueling institutional problems; and that uncertainty will be our common fate for the foreseeable future. Institutional leadership will find it necessary, I believe, to adapt at the personal level to the impact of these value changes. We must learn to get along without approbation—to stifle our need to be loved. We must learn to live with situations in which our performance, no matter how meritorious, is outraced by the expectations of the publics with whom we deal.

We must learn to lead in situations in which our control is limited, in which efforts to control will be found counterproductive. And lastly, we must learn new ways of understanding the changes occurring around us. We need to discern patterns of events, to recognize whether trends are reinforcing or are nullifying themselves. We need to be able to discriminate between the fad and the idea whose time has come. Our leaders need, in short, the widsom that will restore people's confidence in our institutions and our society.

Leadership Needs Of the 1980s

By Michael Maccoby

. . . There is a crisis of authority because neither the functions of leadership nor the image of the leader fit the needs of large organizations in an age of rights, limits, new values. . . Nor have universities understood the change and provided the education needed for leadership.

Today, the ideal image of both leader and character in America is in question. We are unclear about what is best in us and what it takes to bring it out. I believe this confusion has resulted from a lack of fit between old styles of leadership and changes in technology, work, and national character.

There are two interrelated aspects of the leader's role. One has to do with the functions of leadership, which may range from inspiring to disciplining, from mediating to commanding. The second has to do with presenting an image, a model that others want to emulate if not imitate. This image draws out and integrates shared traits of character in the leader's constituency (the social character). The ideal leader should bring out the best in people, supporting the ideal character of a particular culture and historical period. When an individual in a position of leadership has the wrong traits or presents an image discordant with the times, that leader's constituency will lack inspiration.

Both the ideal character and the functions of leadership have changed historically, because of economic and social transformations. I believe that there is a crisis of authority, a questioning of its legitimacy, because neither the functions of leadership nor the image of the leader fit the needs of large organizations, especially business and government, in an age of rights, limits, new values, and a changing concept of productivity, which have not yet crystalized into a new ideal character. Nor have universities understood this change and provided the education needed for leadership.

During the past 200 years, there have been three different types of ideal social character in America. These images represent traits adaptive to the dominant modes of production at different periods in our history. By modeling these traits, especially the positive ones, the leaders have both performed the changing functions of leadership, and at the same time projected an image that others copy, thus adapting the social character to the changing styles of production.

The three ideal character types have been: the *independent craftsman* (from the late 18th century to the Civil War); the paternalistic *empire builder* (from post-Civil War to the 1950s), and the *gamesman* (from 1960 to the present). Obviously, these are Weberian ideal types. Not only are real leaders and followers mixtures of these types, but all three exist today in positions of leadership.

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The Ideal of the Independent Craftsman

The ideal of the independent craftsman fit America of the late 18th century, where more than 80 percent of the workforce were self-employed—mainly as farmers, craftsmen, and small businessmen. Jefferson's vision of an egalitarian democracy was built on the basis of economically independent individuals who had the disciplined virtues of experimental farmers and craftsmen.

It was Benjamin Franklin who expressed these virtues, and by omission also pointed to negative traits in the craftsman character, which are the opposites of the positive ones. The virtues Franklin described included moderation, silence, orderliness, resoluteness, thriftness (frugality), industry, sincerity, justice or fairness, temperance or "coolness of head," cleanliness, imperturbability (tranquility), chastity, and humility. ("I cannot boast of much success in acquiring the *reality* of this virtue," wrote Franklin.[1])

These are traits that served a businesslike, male-dominated society of independent craftsmen. Unlike Jefferson's, whose concept of virtue included a developed heart as well as a disciplined mind, Franklin's list of attributes has no place for what have been considered the feminine virtues—charity, love, kindness, compassion, tolerance, and generosity. The negative traits of the craftsman's character not mentioned by Franklin include obstinacy (the negative of resoluteness and diligence), stinginess (the negative of thriftness), and the inability to cooperate (the negative of imperturbability, taciturnity, and of the rugged individualism so admired in a young nation of refugees from authority).

It was difficult to find any leader to satisfy such individualists. It took George Washington, a leader with exceptional qualities of courage and humanity as well as the craftsmanlike traits of the experimental farmer, to inspire cooperation among the founders of the country, who were more attuned to Franklin's individualistic virtues than to Washington's paternalism and magnificence. Reverence for "the father of the country" was ambivalent at best for many who prized independence above all. The image of Washington as Cincinnatus, returning to his plow after leading the army, did not reassure those who feared monarchy and the establishment of a new aristocracy in America. Washington, in turn, did not romanticize his followers. His description of the continental army in 1775 should be instructional for those who bemoan the deteriorization of the "work ethic": "Such a dearth of public spirit and want of virtue, such . . . fertility in all the low arts

to obtain advantages . . . such a dirty, mercenary spirit pervades the whole."[2]

Although, in the first part of the 19th century, Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln appealed to more ambitious traits in the new entrepreneurs and risk-taking frontiersmen, the character of the independent farmer-craftsman-small businessman remained the dominant ideal until after the Civil War. In the early 1830s, Tocqueville wrote that big business could endanger the spirit of equality in America by producing a new elite. In fact, the acceleration of the industrial revolution, the exploitation of technology and resources, and the construction of new organizational pyramids in the post-Civil War economic jungle favored the rise of a new leader and a new ideal character.

The Ideal of the Empire-Builder

As organizations grew more powerful, self-employment declined (by 1970, it included only 8 percent of the workforce).[3] The new leader had to have the entrepreneurial skills and toughness to build industries and to survive in a competitive jungle. He had to manage the flood of new immigrants who wanted work. Today, from a different, socio-economic and cultural perspective, we emphasize the negative traits of the empire builders: exploitation, domination of the weak, the crushing of rivals, greed. Andrew Carnegie, unique among robber barons because he had a conscience, justified his predatory career by philanthropy and an appeal to social Darwinism; but he betrayed those who got in his way, even his closest business partner, Henry Clay Frick. As an old man living in New York City, Carnegie sent a messenger down the street to Frick's house, saying that since they were now old, he would like to meet Frick one last time and forget the past. The reply was, "Tell Mr. Carnegie I'll meet him in Hell."[4]

There was also a positive side to the industrial patriarch, as expressed by Carnegie's philanthropy and the even greater paternalism of entreprenuers like Thomas Watson of I.B.M., who protected loyal followers in their industrial baronies with job security. Such leaders could be trusted because they owned the business and stood by their personal principles. This image of the ideal, responsible patriarch was supported by a new ideal social character, which was described by novelist Horatio Alger.

The heroes of Horatio Alger became the models for success in a society increasingly dominated by big business. In contrast to the conservative, self-contained and taciturn craftsmen, Alger's heroes, like Ragged Dick, are smart-talking, tricky, and entrepreneurial. They are liberal spenders with a taste for elegance.[5] They are poor, but tough and honest, neither mean nor lazy. Dick works hard and charges more than the other boys for his shoe shines, because his service is better. In a way, the heroes of Horatio Alger represent the successful barons' version of an inner-directed climb from poverty that justifies subsequent riches. In his model of a success story, there is generally a paternal figure around to recognize the hero's virtues and give him a chance to rise further in big business. The climber and the patriarch need each other. In a symbiotic sense, the hero's lack of a father expresses the change in both the culture and the social character needed for success. Ambitious boys must seek new fathers who have mastered the new challenges, leaving behind their own less adapted fathers (as was the case with Andrew Carnegie, whose father was an unsuccessful craftsman).

The paternalistic leader probably appealed more to the immigrants at the turn of the century, to new Americans in need of a Godfather, than to the still-independent craftsmen who were being forced into increasingly routinized factory jobs. The struggle against the paternalistic jungle fighter was led by unions. Women joined the battle; first to gain the right to vote, then for equal rights and respect at the workplace. The civil-rights and the anti-war movements also challenged and weakened traditional patriarchal power and the image of the lion-like jungle fighter as ideal leader.

The challenge to patriarchy has not been limited to the United States. Throughout the world, revolutions against the old orders and increased demands for rights by those—women, youth, minorities—who were dominated by old men in power have de-legitimized traditional authority. The automatic respect once commanded by parents, priests, professors, and presidents now must be earned. Even in Japan, a society that was considered an example of patriarchy at its strongest, where the group dominates the individual, studies now show a decline in respect for parents, with new desire by the young for "ikigai," self-realization.

The Ideal of the Gamesman

In the United States, as the social character became more self affirmative and the spirit meritocratic, a new image of leadership appealed to Americans—that of the gamesman. Adventurous and ambitious but fair and flexible, the gamesman reminded Americans of an earlier, more exciting, anti-bureaucratic frontier spirit, of Jacksonian capitalism before the era of industrial empires and robber barons.

The arrival of the gamesman image of leadership coincided with the election of John F. Kennedy as president. Kennedy promised to invigorate a country gone flabby under the leadership of a tired paternal figure. His New Frontier energized the electronics and aerospace industries, which were also discovering they needed gamesmen to lead teams of specialists in research and development of new systems.

The gamesman has become the dominant model for leadership in America. Unlike the paternal leader who demanded deference, the gamesman enjoys challenge. With a boyish, informal style, he controls subordinates by persuasion, enthusiasm and seduction rather than heavy and humiliating commands. Fair but detached, the gamesman has welcomed the era of rights and equal opportunity as both a fair and an efficient climate for moving the "best" to the top.

In retrospect, Abraham Lincoln, who lived between the ages of craftsmanship and industrialism, appears to have been the prototype of the meritocratic gamesman of the technotronic age. "His ambition was a little engine that knew no rest," said his law partner, William H. Herndon.[6] He was impatient; bored by lack of challenge, he rode the circuit compulsively. Although moved by a sense of justice, he was self protective and detached, a political realist and strategist who tailored his speeches to different audiences in the north and south of Illinois. Frederick Douglass criticized Lincoln's lack of feeling for blacks, saying he was "entirely devoted to the welfare of white men," but he also said that Lincoln was "the first great man that I talked with in the United States freely,

who in no single instance reminded me of the difference between himself and myself, of the difference of color."[6]

Unlike most gamesmen, who remained addicted to the exhiliration of winning, Lincoln, as Richard Hofstadter points out, "was chastened and not *intoxicated* by power."*

Lincoln was not merely ambitious. He was also, as Herndon testified, "a man of heart." The modern gamesman, unlike the robber barons, is not a hard-hearted power seeker; but few approach Lincoln's qualities of heart. Most gamesmen are detached, ungenerous, and uncompassionate, even though they are fair. The typical gamesman feels it is dangerous to open one's heart. Emotion, feeling, and compassion may cloud strategy and weaken the will to win.

The positive traits of the gamesman—enthusiasm, risk-taking, meritocratic fairness—fit America in a period of unlimited economic growth and hunger for change. The negative traits of manipulation, seduction, supercareerism, and the perpetual adolescent need for adventure were always problems, causing distrust and unnecessary crisis. They have become serious liabilities in this period of limited resources, when the team no longer can be controlled by promises of more, and productivity requires a higher level of trust and cooperation.

In universities, gamesman leaders took over in the 1960s and supported the idea of making the academic game fairer, not only on the grounds of justice, but on the grounds that affirmative action would bring out the best in people. In a period of retrenchment, where the need is for greater concern for the common good, gamesman leaders become helpless against employee groups, which often select jungle-fighter leaders to protect their interests. The university then becomes a battleground for departments and/or unions fighting for a lion's share of scarce resources, at the expense of rational planning or mutual concern with educational policy and the needs of students.

In business, such a deterioration of common purpose would lead to bankruptcy. David Riesman believes that it will hasten the failure of private colleges, but that since no state university has ever been closed, there is not even the threat of survival to balance the domination of interest groups.[7]

The Leadership Problem Today

The gamesman does not provide the leadership needed by organizations in this era of limits, because he has no vision of development beyond winning. Many people are turned off by his careerism and lack of compassion for those who are not winners in the meritocratic game. The gamesman runs and rationalizes the organizational pyramids. He may even make them fairer, but he does not transform them. He offers no alternative to what Burton Bledstein calls "the vertical vision of life."[8] He does not appeal to responsibility or a sense of service, but to winning and a sense of glory. He promises that no one will have to sacrifice if everyone plays his position well, but this is not always the case. In a world of shrinking resources, people must be prepared to make difficult choices; but without responsible paternalists at the top, who is there to care about the common good? Who will protect the weak from the strong? God the father, the paternalistic god, is replaced by what the movie *Star Wars* popularized as "the Force"; the spirit of justice and compassion gives way to a winning attitude. As fewer are able to win, more see the game as each against all.

Many employees within the meritocratic pyramids in business and government today lack the spirit to do their work properly. This is sometimes called a "morale problem," which leaders blame on the decline in "the work ethic" or a failure in "communications." This implies either that people are to blame or that the problem can be solved mechanically. I believe the problem goes deeper: it is one of both a changing American character and confusion in the ranks of leadership, which do not fully understand the change.

In *The Gamesman*,[9] I cited the symptoms ("difficulties") checked by a significant percentage of successful managers. Many were individuals moving up the corporate ladder to positions of leadership. Their symptoms indicated anxiety, guilt and depression. Managers were anxious about constantly being rated, about how they were doing and about whether or not they were really needed, and about controlling impulses—including criticisms—that might get them in trouble. They felt guilty about giving in too much, about betraying their best impulses and values to get ahead. And they were depressed by the friendless, deadening atmosphere resulting from competition and repression of feelings. Some who consciously were satisfied with work reported unconscious disturbances, such as dreams of being buried alive or of offices filled with corpses. That is indeed a profound problem in morale and communications, starting at the top.

The problem of leadership in large organizations today, in an age of limits, is how to create organizational goals that will bring out the best in workers who are becoming increasingly skeptical and self affirmative, more interested in enjoying life than any generation in American history. These are people who adapt to career requirements, but who rebel, often unconsciously, against wasting their lives in dehumanized bureaucracies.

Social and Character Changes in America

The change in American social character appears to be the result of two broad currents. One is the transformation of traditional rural to modern urban values, based on revolutionary changes in technology, increased education and the disappearance of a sense of independence rooted in self employment. The other, as noted, is the decline of patriarchal authority, based on new demands for human rights. These are, of course, trends. Some people, especially in rural areas, still fit into the older patterns. But increasingly, as studies by Daniel Yankelovich and the National Opinion Research Corporation show,[10] the new values are becoming dominant and determine attitudes at work, and unless leaders understand them, they may bring out the worst rather than the best in the emerging social character.

*Hofstadter writes, "There had always been a part of him, inside and out of reach, that had looked upon his ambition with detachment and wondered if the game was worth the candle. Now he could see the truth of what he had long dimly known and perhaps hopefully suppressed—that for a man of sensitivity and compassion to exercise great powers in a time of crisis is a grim and agonizing thing. Instead of glory, he once said, he had found only 'ashes and blood.' This was, for him, the end product of that success myth by which he had lived and for which he had been so persuasive a spokesman. He had had his ambitions and fulfilled them, and met heartache in his triumph."[6]

The Emerging Social Character

Positive Traits	Negative Traits
Self development	Self centeredness
Flexibility and tolerance	Marketing the self, careerism
Critical attitude toward power, expressing needs for equity in participation	Rebelliousness toward authority, beating the system

One of the most significant social changes in America in this century has been the migration from farms and small towns to cities. Traditional rural values included fundamentalist religious beliefs and an ethic of hard work and self-sacrifice for the family. The modern urban individual is skeptical about religion and oriented to self rather than family. Technological advances have lessened the prevalence of back-breaking jobs and stimulated new desires for entertainment. Education has encouraged more people to aspire to higher status. Freed somewhat by technology and affluence from the tyranny of necessity, individuals of all classes have broken old taboos and chased experiences that in the past were the exclusive property of the rich. From a psychoanalytic point of view, sexual liberation and the permission to consume rather than save have undermined the main mechanisms of the traditional uptight, hoarding character. *The negative traits are narcissistic—self-centeredness and greediness. The positive traits are increased concern and responsibility for self development, learning, and health.*

The disappearance of self employment is in large measure a result of the demise of the family farm and the small-town services that supported it, with the corresponding growth in large organizations. Gone with self employment is the comforting idea that if one does not like work in the organization, one can always go out and start a business. Increasingly, the sense of independence is rooted in one's technical and managerial skills, rather than ownership of a farm or a business. *The negative traits associated with this change are careerism and self marketing; the need to sell oneself, to make oneself an attractive package at the expense of integrity. The positive traits are flexibility and tolerance, and the ability to understand and cooperate with strangers.*

The decline in patriarchy, due both to urban values and the many challenges to the domination of the father and the boss, results in the demand for rights and the demand that leaders justify their actions, as opposed to the demand for protection—although many people are like adolescents who want both.

For organizations, *the negative side of this trend is the crisis of authority. Lacking respect for traditional bosses and angry at the impersonality of large, anonymous organizations, employees become experts at beating or sabotaging the system. The positive side of this trend is a critical, questioning attitude, the wish for maturity and mutual respect, to be involved, to have a say, to contribute to a principled organization.*

The primary tasks of leaders are to understand both motives and resistances to change, and to establish operating principles that build trust, facilitate cooperation, and explain the significance of the individual's role in the common purpose.

New Concerns for Leaders

How do these issues translate into the pressing immediate concerns of leaders?

More is demanded from leadership now than in the age of paternalism or of unlimited economic growth. The combination of increased competition, the need to innovate and cut costs, new technology and materials, changing government regulations, and changing attitudes of workers demand a higher level of leadership in organizations than ever before. The primary tasks of leaders are to understand both motives and resistances to change, and to establish operating principles that build trust, facilitate cooperation, and explain the significance of the individual's role in the common purpose. What brings out the worst in employees, including middle and lower levels of management, is a sense of powerlessness due to the size of the workplace and anonymous authority that treats everyone like a part in a large machine. Insecurity, suspicion, rumor, and a sense of injustice grow in organizations where employees do not understand the reasons for decisions and do not have a say in how work is organized and evaluated.

In my experience, only a small minority of workers have a negative character structure that is immune to good leadership and the resulting peer pressure to cooperate. This is a generation prepared to communicate and responsive to reasonable explanations. Leadership will bring out the best in the emerging American character only by welcoming the positive aspects of character, and by establishing a moral code that appeals to the common good and meets needs for participation, personal development, and equity. The trust earned by the best paternalists can be achieved by the modern corporate leader only by establishing constitutional principles in the workplace. Only within such a constitutional system will the task of leadership become easier as responsible followers accept some of the functions of leadership and the discipline of responsibility.

Yet there is a tendency, well known to psychoanalysts, for an individual who is at a point in life that demands further growth and maturity to regress, to seek a solution in a more comfortable but unrealistic image. Many organizational responses to new values of self concern and individual rights—participation may be what Erich Fromm called escapes from freedom,[11] attempts to recreate the paternalistic Godfather or to set up a foolproof, unbeatable, craftsmanlike control system (anonymous authority) that will be fair and authoritative, because it allows no human error (or responsiveness). These ill-fated solutions play on the ambivalence in people, the conflict between the conscious wish for autonomy and yearnings for protection and dependency.

The day of the patriarch is over. Nostalgic leaders want deference, but lack the responsiveness and personal concern for their employees of paternal leaders who own their own

companies. Employees want their rights and resent autocratic leadership, but at the same time want to avoid rational discipline and complain that leaders don't care about them. For many leaders and followers, the ideal of "participative management" (that vague, quasi-ideological term which does not mean voting or representative democracy, but only makes sense if it involves participative study of problems within a structure of strong, rational authority) is that of the boss-parent talking directly to the workers, at the expense of middle managers who are seen as the ambitious, uncaring older siblings.* A number of programs in government and business based on this illusion that paternalism can coexist with a society of rights and obligations have resulted in the undermining of the managerial structure, raising expectations that cannot be met and eventually fomenting cynicism on all levels.**

Within industry, especially the large technology-creating companies, change in product design, technology, and jobs is constant. Competition increasingly demands higher quality and lower costs. From managerial levels on down, effectiveness requires responsibility and teamwork, which cannot be controlled by authoritarian management. How does management develop the higher levels of trust and involvement that will increase quality and effectiveness, when traditionally this type of concern for people is associated with paternalism? It is not easy to do.

I recently attended a meeting of top and middle managers of a large company. The chief executive exhorted the managers to show more concern about employees, to "communicate" with them and develop a spirit of teamwork. He pointed to evidence of employee complaints that management was not listening to them. Other speakers claimed that improved communication has significantly increased productivity in other companies. The chief executive ordered the managers to report back in six months with results. Privately, the managers complained that they were getting contradictory messages. They were being asked to be more concerned, but were being evaluated by their ability to produce the right numbers. They were being asked to trust people, but the company was investing in new technology to monitor and control workers. They were being ordered to listen to the workers, but no one was listening to them. Why did the managers not complain? Obviously, the problem of trust was not limited to workers.

I recently also attended a meeting of supergrade managers at a large government agency. Following the requirements of the Civil Service Reform Act, they were developing complex new personnel systems. The legislation institutes a Senior Executive Service, which is supposed to make government more effective by increasing the executive's control over the Civil Service through bonus incentives and easier firing of "incompetent" employees. The civil servants, in turn, were responding by using the letter of the law to construct mechanisms and red tape to protect themselves from the arbitrary exercise of executive power.

Before the passage of the legislation, this group of senior civil servants had been trying to achieve a higher level of cooperation among themselves. They had recognized that the overly competitive, hierarchical system impeded communication and collaboration among departments. Personnel systems bring out the worst in bureaucrats by supporting an adversarial atmosphere, increasing distrust among civil servants and between them and the public they are supposed to serve.

The mission of public service, which is what originally motivated the best civil servants to a career in government, often becomes buried beneath the fears of losing one's place, being treated unfairly, and not getting ahead. The new legislation, while intended to improve government, in fact emphasized the vertical vision of life, which conflicts with concern for people, both within and outside the bureaucracy. Defensive behavior on the part of bureaucrats against the junglefighters and gamesmen at the top produces more red tape.

Some leaders believe that since it is impossible to please everyone, the only possible recourse is to muddle through. There are others who grasp at any new technique that promises results; their only goal is survival.

New Models of Leadership

During the past seven years I have been working with and studying leaders in business, unions and government who are trying to develop new models of organization that bring out the best in people. These individuals are convinced that by balancing concern for people (humanistic values) with attention to mission (economic values), it is possible to design better organizations. Some of them were moved to make changes by problems of morale and productivity that demanded response. Others have moved not out of immediate necessity, but from the conviction that change would improve the lives of their employees, and ultimately the quality of work. Given their different goals and the constraints of the market, technology, culture and social character, both the designs of the organization and their styles of management have varied.***

However, these leaders share two personal characteristics that may be essential for a new model of leadership which will bring out the best in the emerging social character.

*Another reason why paternalism breaks down is the size of organizations. It is impossible for the boss to talk with everyone, and by talking with a few, issues of favoritism are raised. A vice president of a large bank told me that he had resolved at Christmas to talk personally with all the people under him. After two days of doing nothing else, he had spoken with one-third.

**Our studies of government employees suggest that some are suspicious of increased participation, even when it might improve both morale and effectiveness, because the term has been used to rationalize soft, paternalistic and protective management. Indeed, some of the most popular managers demand little and shelter "their people" from higher-ups, who are pictured as hard hearted.

***A primary task of leadership is to establish operating principles that build trust. Otherwise, no amount of teambuilding, involvement or attempts at communication will work. As Philip Sleznick wrote in 1957 (*Leadership in Administration*, New York, Harper & Row). "We shall not find any simple prescription for sound organizational leadership; nor will it be purchased with a bag of tricks and gadgets. It requires nothing less than the proper ordering of human affairs, including the establishment of social order, the determination of public interest, and the defense of critical values."

Establishing organizational values, the moral code, is, as Chester Barnard wrote in 1938 (*The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge, Harvard), "the highest function of the executive." In an age of individual rights, values of equity and respect are essential to creating trust on all levels, and the willingness of individuals to participate fully.

(1) They have developed or are developing a philosophy of management which is rooted in a concern for their workers and resentment of wasted human potential. This rooted conviction, in contrast to a rigid ideology, provides a basis for pragmatic experimentation and satisfaction in step-by-step gains. Although most of these leaders share the gamesman's respect for strategy and tactics, they do not suffer the need for perpetual adventure and drama.

These leaders can stand back and let others share the functions of leadership but are able to assert authority on issues of principle, articulating these principles in terms of essential values. They are prepared to defend their values against power. They approach conflict strategically, and they are prepared for retreat when necessary. Their principles provide them the deep sense of security necessary to compromise, but they do not lose sight of their goals.*

(2) They are students of the organizations they lead and are willing and able to "problematize" both the mission(definition of the product or service) and the control systems. They take time from the tiring managerial tasks of responding to crisis to question whether the mission serves society and individuals. They are not willing to gain power or money by appealing to the worst in people. They are engaged by the task of analyzing and reconstructing the organization.

These leaders find that they need help in articulating a philosophy that expresses a progressive spirit in the organization, in developing a rational structure of participation or consultation that avoids anarchy, and in understanding conscious and unconscious resistance to change. It is at this point that, as a participant researcher, I have been able to help some of these leaders.

Leadership in Higher Education

The role of leadership in higher education is in some ways much more complex than it is in business or even government. Entrenched interests want compliant or gamesmanlike leadership, and a leader with strong convictions has little chance either to become a college or university president or to justify himself by demonstrating the immediate success that can follow business ventures. Perhaps, like a political leader, the president might go to the public; but there are times when, given the difficulty of explaining the issues, the risks become great and the rewards uncertain. Still, I know examples of college presidents who are attempting to develop a spirit that counterbalances egocentric interest. They have found that time spent in participative decisionmaking is well spent if it is sharply focussed on analysis of problems and results in commitment to solutions, even though these may include sacrifices. Such activities cannot include everyone; sometimes it is hard enough to carry out this process with middle management, such as department heads.

Whether or not college and university presidents succeed in bringing out the best in faculties, trustees, and students, higher education should provide a better curriculum for leadership. Education for leaders should include: understanding of character (the philosophical, psychoanalytic and historical viewpoints), the philosophy of ethics, the sociology of different classes, the anthropology of organizations, political theory, and the study of ideology. There is comparatively little education of this kind available, especially the understanding of character in relation to organizations. Instead, the aspiring leader is generally offered high-level technical training in economics, finance, law or engineering plus bags of tricks and techniques to manipulate and control people, which generally brings out the worst in them.

Recently, at the inauguration of a new school of government at a great university, the faculty boasted that it was teaching managers the most sophisticated methods of economic analysis. A distinguished civil servant and the mayor of a large city both responded that what is needed in government are fewer brilliant economists and more administrators with the ability to lead people. The mayor said, "We need people in government with a strong ethical sense combined with pragmatic understanding. They must be able to listen to people and involve others in planning. They must have the courage to take the heat and bounce back from failure, and the will to keep going."

To conclude, despite the real stresses of leadership and the valid complaints of those in positions of authority, there is no shortage of would-be leaders who do not inspire or lead, either because they maintain outmoded styles of leadership or because their only goal is their own survival. If we are to develop a more productive democratic society, what we need are leaders in business, government, and higher education who are able to bring out the best in a changing national character. Although a new model of leadership has not yet crystalized, a few such leaders exist, and they are usually working against the main trends in organizations and education. They are contending not only with individuals or groups that do not want to give up power and control, but also with a heavy, depressed collective spirit, a deadly mixture of anxiety, competitiveness, hopelessness, and secret guilt about self betrayal for career and comfort.

It will be possible to lead the organizations of the 1980s, but there is a shortage of both the kinds of leaders needed and the education they require. If adequate leadership emerges, it will be largely through on-the-job, social research and development. Leaders will develop higher levels of trust and teamwork if they participate with those they lead in studying organizational problems, experimenting with solutions, and evaluating alternatives according to both economic and human (moral) criteria.

*In describing Woodrow Wilson's *strengths* as a leader (he also had significant weaknesses), Arthur S. Link writes, "Wilson worked from a basis of carefully thought-out fixed principles: a series of basic assumptions of what was morally, socially, politically right and wrong. With that, he used the instrumentalities at hand to get the best solutions possible. He was able to compromise without losing sight of his true objectives. This gave him a sense of security.

"Only a person with that kind of security can truly comprehend and deal with the ambiguities and perplexities of life, can freely and fearlessly run its moral risks, and provide strong leadership. As Luther said, 'Believe in God and sin bravely.'" (Washington Post, April 7, 1979).

Footnotes

[1]Jesse L. Lemisch, ed., *Benjamin Franklin: 'The Autobiography' and Other Writings*, New York: New American Library, 1961, p. 104.

[2]James Thomas Flexner, *Washington, The Indispensable Man*, Boston, Little Brown, 1974, p. 73.

[3]United States Census figures.
[4]Joseph Frazer Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 764.
[5]Horatio Alger, Jr., *Ragged Dick* and *Mark, the Match Boy*, New York: Collier Books, 1962.
[6]Richard Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, New York: Vintage Books, 1948.
[7]Personal communication between author and D. Riesman.
[8]Burton Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America*, New York: Norton, 1977.
[9]Michael Maccoby, *The Gamesman*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976.
[10]See Daniel Yankelovich, "The New Psychological Contracts at Work," *Psychology Today*, May 1978, pp. 46-50; M.R. Cooper, B.S. Morgan, P.M. Foley, and L.B. Kaplan, "Changing Employee Values: Deepening Discontent," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1979, pp. 117-125.
[11]Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York: Rinehart, 1941.

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